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Abstract:  Consumers can accumulate product information on the basis of a combination of 
searching, product advertising and expert advice. Examples of experts who provide product 
information include doctors advising patients on treatments, motor mechanics diagnosing car 
problems and recommending repairs, accountants recommending investment strategies, and 
plumbers making recommendations on alternative water heaters. In each of these examples, the 
transactions involve the sale of goods and services where the seller is at the same time an expert 
providing advice on the amount and type of product or service to be purchased. In the case of 
water heaters, the plumber advising a consumer on their choice of water heater will most likely 
also install the appliance. Because of the information asymmetry there is potentially a strategic 
element in the transmission of information from expert to consumer. This paper reports on an 
econometric investigation of the factors that determine the choices made by consumers and the 
recommendations made by plumbers and the extent to which plumbers act in the best interests of 
their customers. The empirical work is made possible by the availability of stated preference data 
generated by designed experiments involving separate samples of Australian consumers and 
plumbers. We find some evidence that plumbers have higher preferences than consumers for 
heater characteristics that increase their profit margin.  
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I. Introduction 
For some goods, consumers are not well placed to immediately judge product attributes, a 
situation that leads to a derived demand for information. Product information can be obtained 
through consumer search, product advertising or from experts who provide advice. It is the latter 
case with which we are most concerned. Examples of experts who provide product information 
include doctors advising patients on treatments, motor mechanics diagnosing car problems and 
recommending repairs, accountants recommending investment strategies, and plumbers making 
recommendations on alternative water heaters.  
 
Nelson (1970, 1974) makes a distinction between search and experience characteristics of goods. 
Search characteristics are product attributes about which consumers are able to obtain relevant 
information and make judgements prior to purchase, whereas experience characteristics are 
attributes about which judgements can only be made some time after purchase of the product, for 
example, reliability. Darby and Karni (1973) introduced the additional concept of credence 
characteristics, which are attributes that are difficult to evaluate even after purchase. How does a 
consumer determine whether a replacement car part was changed prematurely or not? 
 
In each of the examples cited above, the transaction involves the sale of goods and services that 
can be classified as possessing experience or credence characteristics. Another important aspect 
of these examples is that the expert providing advice on the amount and type of product or 
service to be purchased is at the same time the seller of those products and services. Darby and 
Karni (1973) note that for firms involved in the joint provision of diagnosis and services, the 
combination of information asymmetry, together with the high cost of detection of “fraud”, 
implies that firms may have an incentive to provide false or misleading information.   
 
The involvement of experts in the decision-making process complicates the standard analysis of 
consumer choice, which may explain the neglect of this aspect in empirical work. A primary aim 
of our modeling is to overcome this deficiency and hence to provide a better understanding of the 
interaction between a consumer and an expert in the context of a consumer deciding on what type 
of water heater to purchase where the advice is provided by a plumber.  
 
In his analysis of the selection of space and water heater systems, Dubin (1986a, p.112) chooses   3
to avoid the type of problem that concerns us by assuming that: 
 
“… the structure of supply and demand encourages sellers to act as de facto agents for 
buyers so that the distinction between construction to stock and construction to order 
disappears.” 
 
Whether such distinctions are important or not would seem to warrant further investigation. 
Green (1983) recognized the potential for similar influences in his econometric analysis of the 
choice of space heating fuel, but, unlike Dubin, his modeling distinguishes between houses built 
by owners and those built for sale. Green (1983, p. 338) notes that this distinction: 
 
“… was made in order to examine the contention that individuals building for sale will act 
to minimize the construction costs without regard to what this might do to operating costs.” 
 
In a similar vein, Hubbard (1998) investigates the probability that motor vehicles fail emissions 
inspections as a function of vehicle and inspector characteristics. The extent of the moral hazard 
problem is measured by the differences between the failure probabilities associated with 
inspectors in a private firm that also carries out repairs, and inspectors that are state officials 
having no affiliation with a repair operation. 
 
Several aspects of the consumer/expert relationship included in our work cannot be tested with 
the type of data used by Green (1983) and Hubbard (1998). Both of these studies relied on data 
generated by natural experiments. Our work benefits from the availability of stated preference 
data collected specifically for this study. These data were obtained using designed experiments 
involving separate samples of Australian consumers and plumbers.  
 
The Random Utility Model (RUM) that underpins the empirical modeling of discrete choice 
situations guides the econometric analysis. Mixed logit models previously used by Brownstone 
and Train (1999) and Revelt and Train (1998) are specified and estimated using simulated 
maximum likelihood. These provide a flexible framework for representing the distribution of 
preferences of consumers and plumbers and the resultant choices they make.  
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Although the data sets for consumers and plumbers were collected separately, our experimental 
design specified a number of common variables and attribute levels across the two data sets, and 
included variables that capture the impact of each party on the other. This allows us to compare 
choice criteria of plumbers with preferences of consumers and enables us to investigate the extent 
to which plumbers act in the best interests of their customers. Our econometric results indicate 
that for some, but not all, water heater attributes plumbers and consumer preferences are closely 
aligned. The ability to explore such relationships is one of the key features of the current work 
and distinguishes it from previous analyses of the demand for consumer durables. 
 
II.  Interaction between consumers and plumbers 
A stylized version of the purchase decision faced by the consumer sees the consumer as having to 
choose between two or more types of water heater, each of which comprises a different bundling 
of physical attributes, running costs, purchase price and financing options. One of these water 
heaters is better suited to the consumer’s needs but the consumer does not know which one it is. 
Moreover, even after purchase it would be difficult for the consumer to determine whether the 
most suitable water heater has been chosen. The consumer interacts with a better-informed 
expert, a plumber, who provides advice to the consumer who then makes a purchase choice that 
affects the welfare of both plumber and consumer. Because of the information asymmetry and, in 
particular, the fact that water heaters have experience and credence characteristics, there are 
incentives for plumbers to behave strategically in their transmission of information. This 
structure is reminiscent of the strategic information transmission games formulated by Crawford 
and Sobel (1982) and Pitchik and Schotter (1987). 
 
Consumers are assumed to base their decision on the attributes of the water heater and the 
plumber’s advice. The willingness of the consumer to accept the advice of the plumber will 
depend on an evaluation of the plumber’s capability. Hence, variables that capture the technical 
competence of the plumber (e.g. trade certificates) and the nature of the relationship between the 
two parties need to be included in the consumer’s choice model.  
 
Plumbers are assumed to provide two services: advice on the water heater that is best suited to 
the consumer’s needs, and the provision and installation of the water heater ultimately chosen. 
Because of licensing laws, a plumber will be required for the installation of the water heater. For   5
advice and other expert services, a plumber is typically not legally required and hence the 
question is whether the consumer seeks the involvement of the expert or not. However, one could 
imagine realistic situations where the two roles of advice and installation are divorced. 
Consumers may go to a retail outlet to obtain their expert advice and on making a choice; they 
can employ a plumber to make the installation. Separation of the advice and installation services 
would eliminate the incentives for the advice expert to recommend inappropriately. The 
assumption made in this study, that the same plumber provides both the advice and does the 
installation, is supported by our empirical evidence indicating that in a substantial proportion of 
cases, the plumber acts both as an expert adviser to the consumer and as the tradesman. This is 
not surprising in markets such as plumbing services where there are economies of scope that 
mean it is much cheaper to provide the two services jointly.  
 
Plumbers make a recommendation to the consumer based on the consumer’s characteristics and 
needs, and the plumber’s own preference for doing the job. There is no reason why this 
preference should correspond to what is best for the consumer, and there may be incentives for 
the plumber to give misleading advice. The consumer may, of course, be aware of this aspect of 
their interaction and might react accordingly by asking for a second opinion or by seeking other 
quotes for the plumbing work. Wolinsky (1993, 1995) has stressed the role of consumer search 
for multiple opinions and reputation effects as mechanisms for disciplining the behavior of 
experts. Even when these mechanisms are unattractive, Emons (1997) demonstrates a similar 
tendency to non-fraudulent behaviour where observation of market data allows consumers to 
infer the incentives of experts. Hence, variables relating to the nature of the relationship between 
the parties are also included in the plumber model. To capture the plumber’s preference for doing 
the job, we include variables such as the profit that they expect to make, the ready availability of 
the water heater, and the ease of installation.   
 
Within this framework it is possible to consider whether plumbers act as “perfect agents” for 
consumers in the sense of Culyer (1989). Do plumbers make the same choices as consumers 
would make if consumers possessed the full information held by the plumbers? Perfect agency 
would exist if the plumber has no ability to mislead consumers, as would be the case, for 
example, if consumers had full information. This extreme situation destroys one of the central 
premises of the problem that has been formulated, namely that there is asymmetric information.   6
We would expect plumber recommendations to be modified in the intermediate situation where 
some consumers are relatively better informed than others. Another situation where one would 
expect perfect agency is if the plumber has no incentive to provide misleading advice, as would 
be the case if the preferences of the two parties were sufficiently similar. Such propositions will 
be translated into testable hypotheses in the econometric analysis to follow. 
 
III. Data 
The main stumbling block in estimating credible empirical models of the appliance purchase 
decision is the lack of suitable data. Studies of appliance choice typically model appliance 
penetrations in terms of the socio-economic characteristics of the household using surveys of the 
equipment that exists in the home. Examples are Bartels (1988); Fiebig and Woodland (1994); 
Plumb (1995); and Vaage (2000). Studies with a more detailed treatment of water heaters include 
Dubin (1986a,b) and Hartman (1984).   
 
There are a number of problems in using such survey data for understanding the purchase 
decision. 
 
a) The current occupier may have moved into the home after the original purchase. 
b) Even if this is not the case, they may not have been involved in the decision process; the 
developer/builder/plumber may have made the decision. 
c) Even if the current occupiers were involved in the decision, their circumstances may have 
changed (income etc.); often the purchase was made up to 10 or 15 years before the survey. 
d) It is difficult to accurately determine the age of the equipment, and hence to link the purchase 
with the appropriate purchase cost and expected running costs of the chosen water heater and 
competing products. 
e) A retrofit may have taken place in the past, in which case it is important to know what 
equipment was in place before the retrofit. 
 
In view of these difficulties, typical appliance choice studies merely identify the relationships 
between appliance stocks and current home occupiers, and have little value for understanding the 
decision-making processes actually involved in the purchase of the appliance. In an attempt to 
overcome these problems our work employs stated preference methods to collect the data   7
required to model water heater choice.  
 
Despite a history in economics of using intentions data (see the survey of Juster, 1964), in recent 
times economists have neglected such data, and have opted for working with market or revealed 
preference data. However, there has been a rapid development in the use of data generated by 
stated preference experiments in other areas of the social sciences, notably in marketing and 
transportation; see Louviere, Hensher and Swait (2000) for a recent overview. Part of the reason 
for this development is the appreciation that stated preference data can provide useful 
information when revealed preference data are deficient or non-existent.   
 
In this study we use stated preference data that were collected in 1999 from a sample of 129 
plumbers and a sample of 312 consumers, who all lived in Sydney, Australia. In order to provide 
a specific choice context, consumers were told that they needed to buy and install another water 
heater but that it was not an emergency, and consequently they had some time to consider 
options. To ensure that respondents were familiar with such a process, they were required to have 
been involved with the purchase of a water heater in the last two years. Plumbers were asked to 
consider a situation where a client asks them to recommend, supply and install a new water 
heater. They were told that the client lives in the house where the heater had to be installed and 
that the household comprised an adult couple with two children. The existing water heater had to 
be removed and replaced but again it was not an emergency situation so that the plumber knew 
the client had time to consider various options.   
 
Both types of respondents were presented with hypothetical choice situations and were asked to 
choose (in the case of consumers) or recommend (in the case of plumbers) from a set of 
hypothetical alternatives. Following the recommendation of Carson et al. (1994), both choice 
experiments included a reference alternative that is constant across all the choice sets. Plumbers 
were asked which of two hypothetical water heaters they would recommend, but they were given 
the option of a "constant" reference alternative of not recommending either water heater. In the 
case of consumers, the "constant" reference alternative was the option of choosing their current 
water heater in preference to the two hypothetical heaters. This adds to the realism of the choice 
tasks, and, in the case of the consumer, it also means that we have a combination of stated and 
revealed preference data. This type of design feature has been used before especially in the area   8
of transport economics; see Louviere, Hensher and Swait (2000) and references therein. 
 
As is standard with stated preference experiments, in order to increase the sample size in a cost-
effective manner, each respondent was asked to perform not just one choice task as described 
above, but rather each consumer was asked to perform eight choice tasks, and each plumber 
sixteen choice tasks. This naturally imparts a panel-data structure to the two data sets. The 
hypothetical water heaters were characterized by several attributes, the levels of which were 
manipulated systematically between different choice tasks, and designed to be orthogonal across 
each data set. Variables ultimately used in the analysis are described in Table 1.   
 
Bartels, Fiebig and McCabe (2001) provide more details of the design and implementation of the 
stated preference data collection. In addition they perform several checks on the reliability of 
responses and on how successful our design is in representing realistic choice options. Their 
analysis shows that consumers had a strong preference for their current heater, choosing this 
alternative approximately 60% of the time. Obviously this is a choice that they have made 
recently, and it is not unreasonable to expect them to again choose this heater in preference to 
others that they are offered. Moreover, when asked about their recent purchase 50% of consumers 
said they simply stayed with their current heater type and did not consider other options.  
 
Evidently there is considerable inertia in the habits of consumers buying water heaters. 
Nevertheless, in about 40% of cases the stated preference alternatives were sufficiently attractive 
for consumers to choose one of the hypothetical heaters. 74.7% of consumers chose a 
hypothetical heater at least once over the eight scenarios they faced and only three of the 128 
distinct hypothetical heaters were not chosen at all. With this sort of variation it should be 
possible to accurately estimate factors driving these choices. 
 
The hypothetical heaters also seemed credible to plumbers.  They recommended all but one of the 
128 distinct heaters at least once and no plumber chose the “can’t recommend either” alternative 
across all scenarios they faced. Over all possible cases the “can’t recommend either” alternative 
was selected only 10% of the time by plumbers.   
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Table 1: Variable Descriptions 
Variable   Definition 
  Heater characteristics (Consumer and Plumber Models) 
TYPE  Type of heater (electric = 1, gas = 0) 
CAP  Capacity of water heater (1.5 times household’s needs = 1, just enough =0) 
WARR  Length of warranty in (tens) years 
  Heater cost variables (Consumer and Plumber Models) 
PRICE  Total price of heater and installation less rebates to consumer (thousands $) 
RUN  Monthly running costs (tens $ where average = $20/month) 
  Plumber’s ratings relative to household’s needs (Consumer Model) 
NORATE  Plumber making no rating (yes = 1, otherwise = 0)  
RATESAT  Plumber’s rating satisfactory (yes = 1, otherwise = 0) 
RATEVG  Plumber’s rating very good (yes = 1, otherwise = 0) 
RATEEX  Plumber’s rating excellent (yes = 1, otherwise = 0) 
  Financing variables (Consumer Model) 
REBATE  Qualifies for 20% Green rebate (yes = 1, otherwise = 0) 
NODEAL  Payment deal (none = 1, otherwise = 0) 
CASH5  5% discount if paying in cash (yes = 1, otherwise = 0) 
LOAN5  Loan at 5% interest for 12 months (yes = 1, otherwise = 0) 
LOAN10  Loan at 10% interest for 12 months (yes = 1, otherwise = 0) 
FSTPAY  First payment of loan (due now = 1, due in 3 months time = 0) 
  Plumber characteristics and relationship (Consumer Model) 
NOCERT  Plumber has no government certificate (yes = 1, otherwise = 0) 
CERTB  Plumber has both a Green and Gold certificate (yes = 1, otherwise = 0) 
CERTGR  Plumber has a Green certificate (yes = 1, otherwise = 0) 
CERTGO  Plumber has a Gold certificate (yes = 1, otherwise = 0) 
PLCHRG  Plumber charge for installation (rate different to standard = 1, otherwise = 0) 
PLDKN  Plumber not known to consumer (yes = 1, otherwise = 0) 
  Consumer income (Consumer Model) 
INCLT50  Income less than $50,000 (yes = 1, otherwise = 0) 
INC50-90  Income between $50,000 and $90,000 (yes = 1, otherwise = 0) 
INCGT90  Income greater than $90,000 (yes = 1, otherwise = 0) 
MINCOME  Individual missing (yes = 1, otherwise = 0) 
  Plumber – job related variables (Plumber Model) 
AVAIL  Availability of heater (in stock now = 1, 3-5 days wait = 0) 
INST  Difficulty of installation (job more difficult than average = 1, otherwise = 0) 
REBATE  Rebate to consumer or plumber (yes = 1, no rebate of any kind =0) 
PROFIT  Quote for supply and installation, less retail price after trade discounts and rebates
  Consumer characteristics and relationship (Plumber Model) 
SUB  Suburb in which consumer lives (upper middle class = 1, working class = 0)  
OTHBIDS  Consumer will ask for other bid (likely = 1, otherwise = 0) 
MAG  Consumer has access to Choice magazine (yes = 1, otherwise = 0) 
BEF  Consumer has worked with plumber before (yes = 1, otherwise = 0) 
FUT  Plumber likely to receive future work from consumer (yes = 1, otherwise = 0) 
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Because of our focus on the relationship between a consumer and an expert plumber, it is natural 
to ask how important expert advice is in the choice of consumer durables such as a water heater. 
In our sample of 129 plumbers, 67.4% indicated that, in their most recent job, consumers asked 
for their advice about the type and model of water heater to install. This is somewhat higher than 
the 61.3% when the 312 consumers were asked a comparable question. However, the consumers 
in our stated preference survey were screened. In a separate representative sample of Australian 
consumers commissioned from Newspoll, 45.1% of respondents indicated that they received 
advice from their plumber when buying a water heater. Naturally this advice need not be heeded. 
However, a surprisingly high proportion (94.2%) of respondents who sought advice indicated that 
they accepted at least some of the plumber’s recommendations. While the impact of plumbers is 
possibly not as great as they think, it seems plausible that for a substantial proportion of cases the 
plumber’s advice will be sought and will have some impact on the choices made by the 
consumer. 
 
To put these findings in a broader context, the 312 consumers in the stated preference study were 
asked to indicate on a five point scale their willingness to seek advice from eleven different types 
of experts. Of these eleven types of experts, people were most willing to accept the advice of a 
policeman on parking restrictions or the advice of their doctor. Plumbers were on a par with 
mechanics advising someone about engine repairs. In these cases the average response on the five 
point scale was somewhere between level 2, "accept most and probably do", and level 3, "may 
have doubts but do most". People were least likely to accept the advice of a hairdresser/barber 
advising them on shampoos or their accountant advising them about share investments. In terms 
of investigating the interplay between consumers and experts, plumbers seem to be a good choice 
in that their advice is unlikely to be accepted blindly, nor is it likely to be completely ignored. 
 
IV.  Mixed logit choice model 
Each of our consumers and plumbers face a choice amongst J alternatives repeated under S 
alternative scenarios or choice situations. Both cases can be represented in a common framework 
where the utility that individual i derives from choice j in scenario s is denoted by 
 
isj i isj isj X U ε β + ′ = ) 1 (  
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where  Xisj  is a K x 1 vector of explanatory variables and β i is a conformable vector of 
coefficients. 
 
Conditional on β i, and assuming the disturbance terms ε isj to be distributed as iid extreme value, 
the standard multinomial logit specification results with the probability that individual i chooses j 



















As is well known, the specification with common parameters β i for all individuals suffers from 
the undesirable independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) property. A generalization that 
accounts for the panel structure of the data and that allows for possible heterogeneity amongst 
consumers and plumbers involves introducing parameter heterogeneity by setting: 
 
ki k k i ki Z ω σ β β + ′ = ) 3 (  k  =  1,…,K 
 
where Zi is a vector of observed characteristics of respondent i, the β k  are parameter vectors and 
σ kω ki represents unobserved heterogeneity in the  preference weights. We will assume that the ω ki 
follow standard normal distributions, independent of each other and of the ε isj. Notice that this 
specification allows for β ki to vary over individuals, but not over the repeated choices made by 
that individual. Error correlation is introduced across choices but this correlation is not perfect 
because of the presence of the independent extreme value term ε isj.  
 
The resultant random parameter or mixed logit model has recently become very popular in 
empirical work, providing a flexible and computationally practical discrete choice specification. 
[See Brownstone and Train (1999), McFadden and Train (2000) and Revelt and Train (1998) for 
applications and further support for this type of specification.] 
 
The standard way to estimate this model is simulated maximum likelihood. Let ωki
r
  be 
independent draws from N(0,1) (r = 1,…,R; k=1,…,K; i = 1,…,N). For given parameter values   12
and characteristics, let β i
r be the corresponding vector of preference weights β ki
r given by (3), 
replacing  ωki  by  ωki
r. Estimation by simulated maximum likelihood (SML) proceeds by 
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is the simulation estimator of the unconditional probabilities obtained by the draws.  Lee (1992) 
derives the asymptotic distribution of the estimator when the number of replications increases 
with sample size. Under certain regularity conditions the estimator is consistent and 
asymptotically normal and if the number of replications rises faster than the square root of the 
number of observations, the estimator is asymptotically equivalent to the maximum likelihood 
estimator.  
 
Our code for this estimator was written in GAUSS and was tested by comparing the results of 
appropriate models against the estimates obtained using LIMDEP and using a program for mixed 
logit estimation downloaded from Kenneth Train's website. 
 
V. Model  specification 
Both the consumer and the plumber utility maximization problems are characterized using the 
standard Random Utility Model (RUM); see, e.g., Louviere et al. (2000). Below we describe the 
structure of the models for the consumers and for the plumbers. Descriptions of the individual 
variables are given in Table 1.  
 
A.  Consumer's random utility function 
It is assumed that the choices of consumers are determined by: water heater attributes, price, 
running cost, plumber’s advice, financing options, and variables that capture plumber 
characteristics and the plumber-consumer relationship. In each of eight choice tasks, the   13
consumer is asked to choose between three different alternatives. Two of the water 
heater/plumber alternatives constitute hypothetical situations (j = 1 and 2), while the third 
alternative (j = 0) allows the consumer to choose neither of them.  
 
In the survey this third alternative was described as their current heater. There was an expectation 
that we would be able to exploit this revealed preference (RP) data within our estimation 
procedure. Consumers would be comparing attributes of the SP alternatives with characteristics 
of the heater that they recently purchased. Unfortunately, the consumers did not know many of 
the heater characteristics so that there was considerable missing data associated with these 
variables and hence little explanatory power in the RP data.The utility of the RP alternative  was 
assumed to be determined by  a linear combination of a restricted set of observed characteristics 
of the current heater and a consumer specific intercept that depends on   household income as 
well as a random unobserved heterogeneity component.  
 
The utility that consumer i receives from alternative j in scenario s is given by: 
 
c
isj i i ij i isj i isj ij
c
isj X RP X X RP U ε β β β β + + ′ + ′ + ′ − = ) ( ) )( 1 ( ) 6 ( 4 3 3 2 2 1 1  
 
where the dummy variable, RP, represents the current water alternative; i.e. RPij = 1 if j = 0, and 
RPij = 0 otherwise. All variables relating to the revealed preference alternative, X3, are constant 
across all the eight choice tasks faced by the consumer. Hence this alternative can be seen as the 
consumer's reference alternative. The coefficients β 1i,  β 2i and β 4i are treated as random 
coefficients, see (3). Variables manipulated in the choice experiment have been divided up 
according to whether they also appear in the plumber’s indirect utility function, X1, or only in the 
consumer’s, X2. The components of β 1i and β 2i are all assumed to follow independent normal 
distributions with means and variances that do not depend on consumer characteristics. Given the 
consumer’s household income, the coefficient β 4i is assumed to follow a normal distribution, 
independent of β 1i and β 2i, but with a mean that depends on the reported household income 
category. In order not to lose too many observations, those with missing income are treated as a 
separate income category.  
 
There were a number of interactions that were allowed for in the design and in the modelling. For   14
example, in the consumer model income was initially interacted with price. But in preliminary 
testing none of these proved to be significant and hence they have been omitted.  
 
B.  Plumber's random utility function  
In each of sixteen choice tasks, the plumber is asked to choose between two water 
heater/consumer situations and to recommend one of them (j = 1 and 2). Plumbers can also 
decide that they can't recommend either of the two alternatives (j = 0). In making their 
recommendations, it is assumed that the plumbers will look at their own interests as well as those 
of the consumers. In particular, in the short term, they will be concerned with the profits they will 
make from the project. But there is also a longer-term interest in building up a good relationship 
with the consumer since this may lead to future jobs. 
 
The main variables affecting the plumber's choices are: water heater attributes, cost variables, 
job-related variables and variables that capture consumer characteristics and the plumber-
consumer relationship. The choice of the “can’t recommend either” alternative is treated as a 
constant reference alternative across all choice sets and its utility function contains only the 
alternative-specific intercept and the random error term. 
 
The utility that plumber i receives from alternative j in scenario s is given by: 
 
p
isj i ij i isj i isj ij
p
isj CR X X CR U ε α α α + + ′ + ′ − = 3 2 4 1 1 ) )( 1 ( ) 7 (  
 
where the dummy variable, CR, represents the “can’t recommend either” alternative; i.e. CRij = 1 
if j = 0 and CRij  = 0 otherwise. The coefficient α 3  is treated as a random coefficient (see (3)), 
which is constant for the sixteen choice tasks faced by each individual plumber, but which varies 
across plumbers. Thus the plumbers are assumed to have individual-specific reference points for 
evaluating the hypothetical alternatives. Variables denoted by X4, represent those that only appear 
in plumber’s indirect utility function, whereas the variables in X1 also appear in the consumer's 
indirect utility function (see Table 1).  
 
Among the job-related variables is the variable "profit", which is the difference between the 
plumber's quote for the job and the purchase cost to the plumber of the water heater. This   15
variable is treated as exogenous in the present analysis.  When one considers that the plumber is 
likely to include a similar profit margin when quoting for both hypothetical water heaters in each 
choice task, exogeneity is not an unreasonable first assumption. However, the approach that 
plumbers take to quoting for jobs, and the relationship of quotes to recommendations, is of 
considerable independent interest and we intend to explore this topic in future work.  
 
VI. Estimation  results 
A. Overview  of  results 
Estimation results are presented for consumers in Table 2 and for plumbers in Table 3. In both 
cases, results are presented using a standard multinomial logit (MNL) model and for the 
corresponding mixed logit model. 
 
Note that comparisons of the MNL and mixed logit estimates require some care. If, in fact, the 
latter is the more appropriate specification, then the parameter estimates and standard errors are 
not comparable because those in the MNL model will be inconsistent. With respect to the 
coefficient estimates, the MNL results are typically smaller in magnitude. This is to be expected 
since, in the mixed logit model, the parameter estimates are normalized relative to the extreme 
value part of the disturbance term, that is, net of the error component introduced by the random 
coefficients. Since the disturbance in the MNL specification captures both sources of error, it will 
have a larger variance and hence normalization relative to this variance will lead to estimated 
parameters that can be expected to be smaller than those of the mixed logit. 
 
Because the stochastic portion of utility has different variances in the two models, it is difficult to 
compare the magnitude of coefficient estimates, but signs can be compared. Coefficient estimates 
typically have expected signs that are consistent across models. Many of the standard deviations 
estimated in the mixed logit framework are large and statistically significant. This indicates the 
presence of considerable preference heterogeneity and vindicates the move away from the basic 
MNL model. While the models are nested, the hypothesis tests are non-standard because the 
parameter space is restricted under the alternative. In such situations the LR test statistic does not 
have the usual chi-square asymptotic distribution; see for example Andrews (1998). However, a 
comparison of fit as measured by the pseudo R
2 statistics clearly indicates that the mixed logit 
represents an improvement over MNL.    16
 
In moving from the MNL to the mixed logit models the improvement in fit is due to allowing for 
heterogeneity, accounting for the panel nature of the data. An intermediate model with a random 
intercept as the only random coefficient captures the panel nature of the data in a more common 
way, adding a random individual effect. For the consumer data the pseudo R
2 for this panel mixed 
logit model with only β 4 random is 0.2408. The pseudo R
2’s for the mixed logit model and the 
MNL model are 0.0815 and 0.2600, respectively. Thus most of the improvement in fit here is due 
to adding the random individual effect β 4. For plumbers this intermediate model with only α 4 
random has a pseudo R
2 of 0.1841, compared to a pseudo R
2 of 0.1441 for the MNL model and 
0.2306 for the mixed logit. For plumbers, adding the random individual effect thus accounts for 
less than half of the improvement of the fit. 
 
B. Consumer  results 
Consider the coefficient estimates produced by the mixed logit model for consumers presented in 
Table 2. Note that the signs of mean coefficients are typically sensible and a large number of 
these effects are precisely estimated. The magnitudes of the estimated standard deviations are 
also sensible. Whenever, mean coefficients are precisely estimated the associated standard 
deviation is typically less than the estimated mean coefficient. This implies that the estimated 
distributions for our random parameters have only relatively small probabilities associated with 
parameter values that have signs different from the mean. Alternative specifications were tried, 
such as assuming a truncated normal distribution that constrains the entire distribution to have the 
same sign. However, similar to the experiences of Revelt and Train (1998) with their use of 
lognormal distributions, we often had convergence problems with this approach. Also, for some 
attributes, having the flexibility of both negative and positive effects is desirable. 
 
Consumers value more capacity and longer warranty and both the mean and standard deviation 
coefficients are significant for these two attributes. Consumers are also very conscious of price 
and running costs. Both mean coefficient estimates are negative and precisely estimated. While 
the running cost standard deviation points at substantial heterogeneity in consumer’s valuation of 
running costs, the same is not true for price. The price standard deviation is small and has a 
standard error that exceeds the point estimate, indicating little heterogeneity in the way 
consumers react to price changes. In some previous work, the price effect is assumed to be fixed   17
a priori; see for example Revelt and Train (1998) and Layton and Brown (2000). The rationale is 
usually to simplify willingness-to-pay (WTP) calculations or to avoid distributions of price 
effects that include positive responses. 
 
Table 2: Estimation results for consumers 
 
  Multinomial logit    Mixed logit   










cap  0.4445  0.0777 0.6879 0.1312 0.7420  0.1905
warr 0.9058  0.1563 1.3185 0.2555 0.6989  0.2576
price  -1.3116  0.1696 -2.0446 0.2562 0.0910  0.2017
run  -0.3328  0.0345 -0.6427 0.0707 0.5092  0.0744
rebate  0.0849  0.0799 0.1260 0.1358 0.4993  0.2283
fstpay  0.0407  0.0761 0.1008 0.1273 0.4468  0.2206
cash5  0.2122  0.1053 0.3861 0.1718 0.5978  0.2611
loan5  0.0167  0.1058 0.0695 0.1656 0.6481  0.2265
loan10  -0.1278  0.1097 -0.2437 0.1875 1.0833  0.2080
certb  0.6952  0.1214 1.4242 0.2106 0.8918  0.3039
certgr  0.4519  0.1218 0.9232 0.2044 0.8880  0.3154
certgo  0.5952  0.1220 1.1883 0.2325 0.1625  0.4207
ratesat  -0.1977  0.1122 -0.2456 0.1827 0.3458  0.2943
ratevg  0.0563  0.1074 0.1856 0.1599 0.3946  0.3082
rateex 0.2862  0.1037 0.5278 0.1677 0.2436  0.2774
pldkn -0.0905  0.0847 -0.1365 0.1626 0.0151  0.3019
plchrg  -0.0505  0.0839 -0.1644 0.1714 0.6088  0.2825
type  -0.7602  0.1096 -1.2775 0.2162 1.3438  0.1873
type*typeRP  1.1747  0.1499 1.6927 0.2845  
RP  -0.0009  0.2989 -0.3011 0.5524 3.0163  0.2347
RP*inclt50  0.3225  0.1159 1.5703 0.5013   
RP*incgt90  0.1431  0.1118 0.0513 0.4509   
RP*mincome  0.1548  0.1194 0.2575 0.4582   
RP*typeRP  0.7105  0.1111 1.2128 0.3540   
RP*mtype  -0.0381  0.3578 1.5959 1.9345   
        
Pseudo R
2 
a 0.0815  0.2600 
Log-likelihood -2154.78  -1736.10 
Note: 
a Pseudo R
2 is defined as 1 – (LL/LL0), where LL is the value of the (simulated) log-likelihood function 
evaluated at the estimated parameters while LL0 is the value of the log-likelihood function for a base model that only 
contains a non-random RP intercept. 
 
The variable “rebate” measures the “green” effect as the rebate itself has been accounted for in 
the price. Its estimated mean coefficient is positive, but small and insignificant. The associated 
standard deviation is large relative to the mean coefficient and precisely estimated. Apparently   18
there is considerable heterogeneity amongst consumers regarding the green rebate. While on 
average there is a positive green effect, a large proportion of consumers do not seem willing to 
pay for environmentally friendly water heaters.  
 
There is a similar pattern of diversity with the financing options. Apart from the cash discount, 
the mean effects of the different loan options are all insignificant but have large and precisely 
estimated standard deviations. Consumers are divided in their views of these attributes. Even in 
case of the cash discount where the mean coefficient is positive and significant, the large standard 
deviation indicates considerable heterogeneity in how consumers value this option. This general 
result is consistent with Revelt and Train (1998) who find substantial variation in how consumers 
respond to loans for high efficiency refrigerators. 
 
Consumer choices are influenced by positive plumber recommendations although only a rating of 
“excellent” has a statistically significant impact. It is also the case that the standard deviations 
associated with each of the ratings are not significantly different from zero. Thus there is no 
evidence of heterogeneity with respect to these ratings. 
 
Plumber certificates have a much greater impact on consumer choices than plumber 
recommendations. Both green and gold certificates influence choice, although the impact of the 
latter is greater. Having both certificates has an even greater impact but the difference relative to 
having just one of the certificates is relatively small. The standard deviations for both certificates 
and a green certificate are large, in contrast to the standard deviation for the gold certificate. All 
of this is expected as the gold certificate already exists in the market and people are going to be 
more certain of its value relative to the green certificate, which exists in other countries but not 
Australia. 
 
That consumers put a high value on certificates is consistent with previous empirical studies on 
the economics of advertising and information provision. For example, Laband (1986) and Mixon 
(1995a,b) provide support for the proposition that suppliers of experience or credence goods, 
such as water heaters, provide more informational cues, such as licenses and certificates, than do 
suppliers of search goods. 
   19
Whether or not the consumer knew the plumber is not important. The estimated mean is 
insignificant, and the estimate of the standard deviation is small and imprecise. Whether the 
plumber charged a standard installation rate also has an insignificant mean effect but the 
associated standard deviation is much larger, indicating substantial heterogeneity.  
 
Water heater type refers to whether the SP alternatives are electric or gas. This impact is allowed 
to vary according to “typeRP”, which represents whether the consumer’s current water heater is 
electric or gas. Clearly, consumers have a strong preference for their existing heater type. 
Consumers currently with a gas heater are likely to choose hypothetical heaters that are also gas 
and similarly for those people currently with electric heaters. These mean effects are quite 
significant. However, the standard deviation for “type” is large as well, which indicates that there 
is considerable heterogeneity around these mean tendencies to prefer gas or electricity. To 
illustrate the effect of the difference in preferences between electricity and gas consumers, we 
calculate the probability of “switching” preferences. According to the estimated random 
coefficient distributions, the probability that an electric consumer (one who currently has an 
electric water heater) would prefer gas is 0.379, while for a gas consumer (one who currently has 
a gas water heater) there is a probability of 0.171 that they’d prefer an electric water heater. The 
finding that the tendency to switch is substantially different across consumer types is consistent 
with the churn rates in our sample of consumers where 12.2% of people who previously had an 
electric water heater switched to gas for their latest purchase while only 1.0% of people who 
previously had gas switched to electricity.  
 
Current water heater type is also interacted with the RP dummy. Here the results indicate that 
consumers, who have electricity as their RP type, are less likely to make an SP choice than 
people with gas as their RP type. (This is the conditional probability, and hence corrects for the 
fact that there are more respondents with electric water heaters.) Consumers, who are in the 
lowest income category, are also less likely to make an SP choice in preference to their current 
water heater. There is no significant difference between the highest income group and the middle-
income group that serves as the base category. 
 
C. Plumber  results 
Results for the mixed logit model for the plumbers are presented in Table 3. As in the case of the   20
consumers, the signs of the coefficients are typically sensible and a large number of effects are 
precisely estimated. Similarly the estimates of the standard deviations are also sensible and 
precise. 
 
Extra capacity, longer warranty, lower running costs and cheaper price, impact on plumber 
recommendations with the same signs as they affect consumer choices. All of these mean effects 
are significant as are the associated standard deviations. The standard deviations are at most a 
similar magnitude to the estimated mean effects. Thus, there is significant heterogeneity but the 
random coefficient distributions only produce relatively small probabilities for signs different 
from the estimated mean effects. 
 
Table 3: Estimation results for plumbers 
 
  Multinomial logit    Mixed logit   










cap  0.9680  0.0715 1.2357 0.1334 1.2779  0.1355
warr  1.1753  0.1501 1.5624 0.1959 0.9709  0.2266
price  -1.1841  0.1920 -1.7267 0.2525 1.0369  0.2347
run  -0.4641  0.0338 -0.6525 0.0651 0.5584  0.0687
avail 0.1829  0.0729 0.2182 0.1090 0.4338  0.1752
inst  -0.2058  0.0749 -0.1813 0.0992 0.0108  0.1951
rebate  0.0369  0.0877 0.0424 0.1377 0.2439  0.2663
profit  0.5923  0.2826 1.2368 0.5780 1.7862  0.3800
sub  -0.1584  0.1554 -0.2576 0.2497 0.1242  0.4252
othbids  -0.0305  0.1552 -0.0094 0.2683 0.2551  0.4468
mag  0.0349  0.1585 0.1573 0.2890 0.7770  0.3095
bef  -0.0153  0.1556 0.1701 0.3072 0.7254  0.3311
fut  0.1288  0.1569 0.2728 0.2598 0.3851  0.3556
type  -0.5170  0.0724 -0.6479 0.1213 0.6367  0.1319
CR -2.7596  0.2899 -4.2849 0.4881 1.4855  0.2943
        
Pseudo R
2 
a 0.1441  0.2306 
Log-likelihood -1616.17  -1452.98 
Note: 
a Pseudo R
2 is defined as 1 – (LL/LL0), where LL is the value of the (simulated) log-likelihood function 
evaluated at the estimated parameters while LL0 is the value of the log-likelihood function for a base model that only 
contains a non-random CR intercept. 
 
Several characteristics related to the nature of the job impact significantly on the plumber’s 
recommendations. Plumbers are more likely to recommend a water heater that is readily available 
and less likely to recommend one that is difficult to install. While both these mean effects are   21
precisely estimated, the standard deviation for ease of installation is small. On the other hand the 
standard deviation for availability is large relative to the estimated mean effect. Thus there is 
considerable heterogeneity with regard to the impact of availability. The situation is similar with 
profit. The more profitable the water heater is to the plumber the more likely it is that plumbers 
will make a positive recommendation. However, the associated standard deviation is large and 
precisely estimated. According to the estimated random coefficient distribution 24.4% of 
plumbers do not assign profit a positive weight in determining their recommendations.   
 
Like consumers, plumbers are not overly influenced by environmental concerns. The mean and 
standard deviation associated with whether there was a green rebate of any kind were both small 
and insignificant. 
 
Factors related to reputation and the relationship between the plumber and the consumer also 
have small and insignificant mean impacts. Presumably repeat business is not an important 
characteristic of the plumber’s market.  
 
The estimated mean coefficient associated with "type" is negative, indicating that plumbers prefer 
gas to electricity. This coefficient is precisely estimated, as is the associated standard deviation. 
Both estimated parameters are similar magnitudes indicating there is considerable heterogeneity 
in preferences but nonetheless a clear majority of plumbers have a very strong preference for gas. 
A possible explanation is that a plumber is typically also a gas fitter, and, unlike with electricity, 
plumbers don’t have to engage another tradesman to connect the water heater to the gas grid.  
 
D.  Comparing consumer and plumber results 
In order to investigate more formally the extent to which plumbers mimic consumer preferences 
in their recommendations, we look more closely at the variables common to the indirect utility 
functions of both consumers and plumbers. Table 4 collects the mixed logit estimates of the mean 
coefficients and standard deviations of the relevant variables. Recall that the consumer and 
plumber models have been separately estimated and in each case the scale is normalized on the 
GEV errors. There is no reason why the degree of heterogeneity reflected in the errors should be 
the same for plumbers and consumers so that even if consumers and plumbers make similar 
tradeoffs, the actual coefficient estimates may still differ by a fixed proportion because of scaling   22
effects.  
 
In the first instance we construct a joint Wald test for the null hypothesis that the ratios of 
consumer and plumber mean coefficients are the same for all four common attributes. The 
resultant chi-square test statistic with 3 degrees of freedom is 8.18, yielding a p-value of 0.042 
and hence rejection of the null at a 5% but not 1% level. Visual inspection of the individual mean 
coefficient estimates in Table 4 indicates that, while those for warranty, price and running cost 
are quite similar between consumers and plumbers, the mean coefficients for capacity are quite 
different. If the Wald test for proportionality is repeated without capacity, then the test statistic is 
only 1.43 with an associated p-value of 0.489, enabling us to accept the hypothesis of 
proportionality.  
 
Table 4: Parameter estimates and tests of differences for attributes common to indirect 
utility functions of plumbers and consumers 
 














      
Capacity  0.6879  0.7420 1.2357 1.2779 8.57* 5.26* 
Warranty  1.3185  0.6989 1.5624 0.9709 0.57 0.63 
Price -2.0446  0.0910 -1.7267 1.0369 0.78  9.34* 
Running cost  -0.6427  0.5092 -0.6525 0.5584 0.01 0.24 
         
* Indicates difference in coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 1% level. 
 
A similar pattern emerges if we test for proportionality among all eight parameters; four mean 
coefficients and four standard deviations. The Wald chi-square test statistic with 7 degrees of 
freedom is 18.87 yielding a p-value of 0.009. Repeating the test without the two capacity 
parameters gives a test statistic of 10.75 and associated p-value of 0.057.  So again, the 
hypothesis of proportionality is rejected at the 5% level if we include the two capacity 
parameters, but it's accepted if we repeat the test without them.  
 
In view of the fact that several of the proportionality factors when comparing the estimated 
parameters for consumers and plumbers are close to unity, Table 4 also presents the individual 
Wald tests for the null hypothesis that each pair of consumer and plumber parameters is the same.   23
These individual tests of differences confirm the distinct situation with regard to capacity; for 
capacity the Wald statistic for testing for equality between the mean responses of consumers and 
plumbers is very significant, while for the other attributes the Wald statistics are quite small.  
 
While, on average, both consumers and plumbers value capacity (see Tables 2 and 3), compared 
to other attributes plumbers clearly place much more weight on capacity than consumers do. On 
the other hand, the standard deviation for capacity is also much larger for plumbers, suggesting 
that the percentage of plumbers who do not attach much value to capacity is similar to that for 
consumers.  
 
With the exception of the price standard deviation, which is very small for consumers but much 
larger for plumbers, the remaining individual tests indicate a remarkable similarity between the 
estimated plumber and consumer coefficients.  
 
“Type” was also a common attribute, but because plumbers’ recommendations did not control for 
the current water heater of their customers, it is difficult to formally test differences between 
preferences of plumbers and consumers for water heater type. However, like the situation with 
capacity, there are indications of substantially different preferences. For a gas consumer the mean 
coefficient for the variable “type” is –1.28 while for an electric consumer the mean coefficient is 
0.41. This indicates a preference for the existing water heater fuel type for both electricity and gas 
customers, but for existing gas customers this preference is much stronger than for electricity 
customers. Taking a weighted average across these two classes of consumers (43.6% of our 
sample had gas), the resultant coefficient for “type” is –0.33 indicating an overall preference for 
gas. By comparison the mean coefficient for “type” for plumbers is –0.65, indicating an even 
stronger preference for gas. 
 
What do these comparisons indicate about the plumber/consumer relationship? For some water 
heater attributes, including warranty, price and running costs, our estimation results indicate 
plumber and consumer preferences are closely aligned. The two attributes where this is not the 
case are capacity and whether the water heater is gas or electric. One might want to argue that the 
plumbers are exploiting their information advantage to extract more profit from their consumers. 
Profit margins are likely to be greater for gas water heaters and for higher capacity heaters, and,   24
unlike say warranty; these attributes have credence and experience characteristics. Consumers 
would find it difficult to know beforehand, or to determine afterwards, whether their newly 
purchased, high capacity water heater was appropriate for them or not.  
 
However, in our experiment we independently vary the cost and hence are able to control for the 
profit received by plumbers in the plumber model. Thus an explanation for the difference is not 
that larger capacity water heaters are more profitable for the plumber; unless perhaps there are 
some characteristics that are not reflected in the plumbers’ quotes or in the other variables used, 
but which are correlated with capacity and lead to different levels of profitability for water 
heaters. 
 
Another plausible explanation is that plumbers might have inaccurate perceptions of the 
preferences of consumers leading them to put undue weight on excess capacity when making 
recommendations. Anyone familiar with water heating advertising in Australia knows that this is 
a key element of the advertising program of the country’s major brand. It is possible that 
plumbers have been more influenced than consumers by this campaign. 
 
As has been explained, plumbers are likely to prefer gas because, unlike with electricity, they 
don’t have to engage another tradesman to connect the water heater to the gas grid. While we 
have controlled for any extra profitability associated with these different arrangements it is still 
likely that plumbers would prefer to avoid involving an electrician in the water heater 
installation.  
 
The differences in the tradeoffs made by consumers and plumbers need to be interpreted with 
some care. In the health economics literature, where the doctor-patient relationship parallels our 
plumber-consumer relationship, the concept of the “perfect agent” has been introduced. 
According to Culyer (1989), the perfect agent chooses/advises as the patient/consumer would 
choose if the patient/consumer possessed the full information held by the doctor/plumber. This 
suggests that we need to take account of, not only a possible difference between the preferences 
of the two types of agents, but also the difference in the amount of information each may have. A 
well-intentioned plumber might recommend a particular type of water heater, despite the fact that 
the plumber knows that it is not the consumer’s preferred choice, because the plumber has more   25
information, and they believe that based on this information, their recommendation is the best 
choice for the consumer. 
   26
VII. Conclusion 
In many countries water heating is one of the two most important uses of gas in the home, and a 
study by the International Energy Agency (IEA, 1989) found that water heating was one of the 
top three residential uses for electricity in each of six OECD countries studied. In the state of 
New South Wales in Australia, water heating accounts for over 50% of residential gas 
consumption and over 30% of residential electricity consumption (Fiebig and Woodland, 1994). 
Moreover, there are new technologies, like high-efficiency instantaneous gas water heaters and 
electric heat pump water heaters, which could have a major impact on the energy requirements of 
water heating (Rollin and Beyea, 1985). The results presented here provide a better understanding 
of the decision processes underlying the choice of water heater, and they provide useful 
information for any policy aimed at reducing energy consumption or CO2 emissions in the 
residential sector.   
 
Unlike previous studies of appliance choice we have attempted to account for the role of experts 
who potentially influence the purchase decisions of consumers. In the absence of revealed 
preference data, the econometric analysis has been made possible by the collection of stated 
preference data on a sample of consumers and plumbers. The results indicate that stated 
preference surveys can be usefully employed to elicit statistically significant and economically 
reasonable preferences for both.  
 
For the particular case of water heaters, our results indicate that key attributes of water heaters 
such as capacity and warranty are important determinants of water heater choice. Price and 
running costs are also important but consumers do not seem to value the different financing 
options that were included in our experiment. Green initiatives by themselves seem to be 
unattractive to both consumers and plumbers. If the government wants to influence choices then 
price levers are needed.  
 
For some water heater attributes, including warranty, price and running costs, our estimation 
results indicate plumbers tend to mimic the preferences of consumers. But this is not the case 
with capacity and whether the water heater is gas or electric. These differences could very well be 
a reflection of the ability of plumbers to exploit their superior knowledge regarding water heaters. 
A plausible explanation exists for why plumbers would want to shade their recommendations in   27
the case of the type of water heater. A possible explanation is given for why capacity is rated 
more highly by plumbers, but this explanation is more speculative. 
 
Overall, the approach and resultant analysis has provided useful insights into the behaviour of 
consumers and their relationship with experts such as plumbers. We feel we have provided a 
potentially useful template for applications to other areas of modelling where there is interaction 
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